"Using notes hastily scribbled on the backs of maps and finished out whenever he was rotated to rear areas for rest, Dr. Klaus Huebner captured in his diary the frustration, fear, boredom, devotion, and anger that were the daily portion of combat infantrymen. The result is a remarkably sustained exposition of combat life. Dr. Huebner traces the 88th’s activities from final staging preparations at Fort Sam Houston to North Africa and on up the Italian peninsula to the Brenner Pass in Austria, just fifty-five miles south of the Bavarian hamlet where he was born."

The 350th Infantry Regiment, 88th Infantry Division, was rated as one of the best U.S. Army Regiments in one of the best U.S. Army Divisions. The 350th fought in the Rome-Arno, North Apennines, and Po Valley campaigns. Summary: The 350th Infantry Regiment was part of the 88th Infantry Division and served in Italy during WWII.

Then in April 1944 he was transferred overseas to command the 350th Infantry Regiment, 88th Infantry Division, in the North African Theater of Operations, later moving with that regiment to the Mediterranean Theater (Italy). In March 1945 he was made assistant division commander of the 88th Infantry Division in Italy.In June 1944 he received the Silver Star. On 21 May 1944. The 2nd Battalion, 350th Infantry, launched an attack against the enemy at the mouth of the valley south of Monte San Biago, Italy, and was subject to intense machine gun and rifle fire from well entrenched positions from which the enemy was laying down fields of grazing and interlocking fire. Colonel Fry himself led the forward platoon, issued his orders from that position, and personally led a tank around the right flank to attack a house from which the enemy was making determined resistance. During this time there were no riflemen in advance of Colonel Fry. The courage, leadership, and personal example displayed by Colonel Fry inspired the battalion and insured the success of the attack. His gallantry in action reflects great credit upon himself and is in keeping with the high ideals of the military service.”

The northern Apennines fighting was the penultimate campaign in the Italian theater. Although the Allies steadily lost divisions, materiel, and shipping to operations elsewhere, which diminished their capabilities, their offensives prevented the Axis from substantially reinforcing other fronts with troops from Italy. Yet the transfer of units from Fifth and Eighth Armies for use in northwest Europe, southern France, and Greece, both after the capture of Rome and during the North Apennines Campaign itself, left Allied commanders with just enough troops to hold Axis forces in Italy but without sufficient forces to destroy the enemy or to end the campaign.

The Allied goals, established before the invasion of Italy, were to gain control of the Mediterranean, keep pressure on the Germans while building for the cross-Channel attack, and force Italy to withdraw from the war.

For the Allied armies in Italy, the Po Valley offensive climaxed the long and bloody Italian campaign. When the spring offensive opened, it initially appeared that its course might continue the pattern of the previous months and battles in Italy, becoming

another slow, arduous advance over rugged terrain, in poor weather, against a determined, well-entrenched, and skillful enemy.

However, by April 1945 the superbly led and combat-hardened Allied 15th Army Group, a truly multinational force, enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority on the ground and in the air. On the other side, Axis forces had been worn down by years of combat on many fronts; they were plagued by poor political leadership at the top as well as shortages of nearly everything needed to wage a successful defensive war. By April 1945 factors such as terrain, weather, combat experience, and able military leadership, that had for months allowed the Axis to trade space for time in Italy could no longer compensate for the simple lack of manpower, air support, and materiel. By the end of the first two weeks of the campaign both sides realized that the end of the war in Italy was in sight, and that all the Allies needed to complete the destruction of Axis forces was the skillful application of overwhelming pressure, a feat largely accomplished within ten days, by 2 May 1945.

The Allied operations in Italy between January and September 1944 were essentially an infantryman’s war where the outcome was decided by countless bitterly fought small unit actions waged over some of Europe’s most difficult terrain under some of the worst weather conditions found anywhere during World War II